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ANALYSIS 
The International Legal Personality of Macau 
Introduction 
The question of international legal status/personality1 is increasingly difficult 
to answer with a degree of precision since the relevance of traditional criteria 
and symbols of statehood is diminishing in a global environment characterised 
by the proliferation of not-readily-definable entities which clamour for recog-
nition as autonomous political units.2 
The requirements of 'a permanent population; a defined territory; govern-
ment; and capacity to enter into relations with other States'3 — which are 
accepted by international lawyers as 'customary international law' — by no 
means represent sufficient4 or even necessary3 qualifications of statehood. 
Clearly, the less legalistic symbols of statehood, such as kings/presidents, 
armies, central banks, currency, or passports, offer no reliable yardsticks.6 
Nor for that matter is membership in the United Nations particularly 
instructive in respect of the key distinguishing attributes of statehood. Current 
members include Carribbean pinpoints such as Saint Christopher and Nevis or 
Saint Lucia, as well as other microentities like Vanuatu in the Pacific or San 
Marino in Europe — but not Taiwan.7 Neither is the UN practice with regards 
to admission — including the implementation of stipulated8 requirements 
'International legal personality' is broadly defined in terms of the capacity to exercise international 
rights and duties. 
The International Standards Organisation, which assigns two-letter codes for country names, has 239 
on the main list — including citizenless Antartica and the contested Falkland Islands — and another 
fifteen 'sensitive' places on a reserve list. 
Article I, 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 
Is the independent principality of Sealand (a steel-and-concrete second-world-war anti-aircraft 
tower governed, since they liberated it in 1967, by Major/Prince Roy and Mrs/Princes Joan Bates) — 
which has its own constitution, flag, coat of arms, stamps, currency, and passport — a 'state'? At a 
more scholarly level, it has been argued that the method by which a 'state' comes into existence is 
of crucial relevance, and that entities that owe their existence to a use of force by one state against 
another, originate in interference with the exercise of the right of self-determination, or are created 
in violation of the principle of non-racial discrimination are a 'nullity' under international law (even 
if they satisfy the four 'traditional requirements'). See John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations 
(Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987). 
Note, for example, that Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted as members of the UN — whose 
membership is confined to 'States' — for decades before they became independent states. 
The European Community/Union, for example, has no king, president, or army but its Ecu is a 
recognised, if unminted, currency; it also has its own diplomats, and holders of the standardised 
passports issued by its members enjoy 'citizen' status anywhere in the EC. The Community is also a 
member of several international organisations and a party to major international treaties. 
Notwithstanding the 'economic strength' ('the world's 25th highest per capita income; 20th largest 
gross national product; 15th biggest overseas trade volume; and the largest foreign-exchange reserve 
holdings in the world') of this 20 million-populated island, its 'preponderant de facto relationships 
with the vast majority of the world's other nations,' and its ability to 'significantly bolster the UN 
assets.' See Fredrick F Chien (Foreign Minister of the Republic of China), 'UN Should Welcome 
Taiwan,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 August 1993, p 23. 
8
 UN Charter, Article 4:' 1 Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states 
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.' 
Vol 24 Part 3 Macau's international legal personality 329 
pertaining to the 'peace-loving' nature of applicants or their ability and 
willingness to carry out the obligations of membership (for example, under 
Chapter VII) — consistent enough to offer useful guidance.9 
It is also evident that terms such as 'state,' 'nation,' or 'country' — which 
underline eligibility for membership in various international organisations and 
specialised agencies — have not assumed an identical (traditional or other-
wise) meaning in all contexts.10 
By the same token, 'international legal personality' is a relative phenom-
enon that — like the 'subjects' of law in any legal system — varies according 
to the progressive requirments of [an increasingly complex] international life.1' 
It is a flexible and open-textured concept which may depict different charac-
teristics in different circumstances. Nor is it constricted to 'sovereign' (itself a 
contextually and historically changeable concept)1Z entities. Thus, while states 
may be said to possess the fullest measure of international personality, interna-
tional organisations are endowed only with the degree of personality that 
enables them to discharge their functions effectively, and the extent of 
personality enjoyed by other subjects of international law depends on various 
factors such as a constitutent treaty or constitution and recognition. 
As a further background to contemporary international legal norms pertain-
ing to the subject, it should also be emphasised that even short of the 
establishment of a 'new order for a new world,'13 it is apparent that rigid global 
structures have considerably loosened. As we are constantly reminded by world 
system analysts, human affairs are undergoing a process of relentless 
globalisation,14 coinciding (perhaps paradoxically) with a process of progres-
sive decentralisation of authority and fragmentation of society.15 Such a 
dissolution of the national-international divide is aptly mirrored in an 
9
 See Yehuda Z Blum, 'UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?' (1992) 86 
American Journal of International Law 830. 
See Frederic L Kirgis, Jr, 'Admission of "Palestine" as a Member of a Specialised Agency and 
Withholding the Payment of Assessments in Response' (1990) 84 American Journal of International 
Law 218. 
1
' See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1949] 1CJ 
Reports 174, 178. 
12
 See Joseph A Camilleri and Jim Falk, The Endof Sovereignty! The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting 
World (Aldershot, Hants: Elgar, 1992). 
Under the new order, international law making would be shared by all members of a non-
authoritarian, broadly reconstituted international society (including a variety of'sub-societies' — 
such as corporations, professional associations, and informal community groups — which are 
currently on the fringes of international law), disregarding national boundaries, ethnic difference, 
nationalism, and other notions of otherness and directed towards achievement of the fundamental 
goals and principles of the (international) society as a whole (that is, the well-being of humanity). 
See Philip Allott, Eunornia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Markets are internationalised; rapidly developing technologies result in 'organisation, communica-
tion, cultural and economic interchange and political strategizing [which] extend over new 
communication territories which pay little or no attention to what may seem the increasingly 
ephemeral boundaries of nation and state' (ibid, p 5); world integration is 'bolstered' by globalisation 
of the security dilemma and the escalating impact of the ecological crisis. 
See James A Rosenau, 'Muddling, Meddling and Modeling: Alternative Approaches to the Study of 
World Politics in an Era of Rapid Change' (1979)8 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 130. 
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embroidery of layers of transnational, supranational, subnational, as well as 
national organisations, criss-crossing territorial boundaries.16 
Not only is the international political scene more diversified, theorists of 
widely diverging ideological persuasions have also noted the erosion of the 
position of the state as the central actor in the international community and 
discerned a trend towards granting non-state actors an increasingly prominent 
role in shaping the norms that order and maintain the international commu-
nity.1 ' The inefficacy of state action in managing contemporary problems (such 
as pollution), with ramifications extending beyond national frontiers, and 
formidable scientific and technological developments, have forced states to 
concede powers to international regulatory organs and surrender to regional 
organisations control over numerous areas previously within the exclusive 
domain of individual states. As clearly signified in the extensive body of 
international human rights law, states can no longer erect barriers in the name 
of domestic jurisdiction and are required to subject themselves to international 
scrutiny and judgment.18 
One need not be a fully-fledged 'post-modernist'19 to conclude that 'things 
are in a state of flux' and prone to rethinking and reconstruction. While no firm 
See R W Manshach and J A Vasque:, In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 
' See R K Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique' 
(1988) 17 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 229 (criticising the state-centric paradigm as 
clearly inadequate at a time of vast transnational interaction on the part of a variety of non-state 
actors); Camillcri and Falk (note 12 above) (illustrating the deficiency of a theory founded on 
compartmentalisation along the boundaries and within the history and planning horizons of nations/ 
states in a world characterised by shifting alliances, new forms of identity, and overlapping tiers of 
jurisdiction). Ingrid D Delupis lists as possessing international legal personality non-state entities 
such as international organisations, individuals, 'nations,' belligerents and insurgents, liberation 
movements, international orders, non-governmental organisations, institutions, national public 
bodies, national private bodies, international companies, and joint ventures. See The Concept of 
International Lm'(Stockhom:Norstedts, 1987), pp 193-4- That multiple non-state actors participate 
in the 'global constitutive process of authoritative decision' has long been the position of the 'policy-
oriented' or 'social process' school. See M McDougal et al, 'Theories About International Law: 
Prologue to a Conf igurative Jurisprudence' (1967) 8 Virginia Journal of International Law 188. As 
elaborated by Lung-chu Chen, 'All participants — conveniently categorized as nation-states, 
international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and associations (in-
cluding political parties, pressure groups, and private associations) and individual human beings — 
now openly or recognizably play important roles and perform numerous functions': An Introduction 
to Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989). Richard Falk predicts the break-up of the state-centred system of international relations and 
the emergence of new forms of 'nonterritorial central guidance' and 'communitarian organization': 
Revitalising International Law (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), p 5. 
It is in fact contended that the term 'sovereignty' denotes now the 'people's sovereignty rather than 
the sovereign's sovereignty.' See W M Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law' (1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 866, 869. See also J D Van der 
Vyver, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International Law' (1991) 5 Emory 
International Law Review 321. 
Taken here to connote the embracing of an intellectual approach which challenges boundaries, 
deconstructs categories, dispenses with metanarratives, eschews grand global pictures, and accepts, 
even celebrates, the simultaneous validity of multiple coexisting, conflicting, often interpenetrating 
realities. See, generally, Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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definition of the [new] 'international legal person' is yet discernible — given 
prevailing shifts in allegiances, concepts, identities, and forms of authority, the 
complex forms of social, economic, and political organisation, and the multiple 
tiers of jurisdiction — it is nonetheless clear that the restrictive yardsticks of an 
older political space must be replaced with more flexible perspectives and way 
given to more expansive pluralistic frameworks able to accommodate 'a world 
in transition.' 
An entity's international legal status/personality, or its capacity to act in 
some measure under international law, should consequently be assessed with 
reference to a range of factors, including: factual 'stately' attributes (such as 
permanent population, defined territory, government); international relation-
ships and associations; international legitimacy (manner of coming into 
existence); international recognition; international legal entitlements (eg, 
right to self-determination); and sui generis qualities. It is within such a 
structure that the following determination of Macau's international legal status 
is undertaken. 
Factual 'stately' attributes 
Notwithstanding its diminutive dimensions,20 Macau possesses factual 'stately' 
attributes. It has been inhabited on a permanent basis since its founding in 
1557, and is clearly identified with a defined territorial unit (consisting of the 
Macau Peninsula, Taipa Island, and Coloane Island).-1 
An effective machinery of government, exercising jurisdiction over the 
population and territory, has also been in place throughout the 437 years of 
Macau's existence. Indeed, while in strict/formal constitutional terms, Macau 
is 'legally tied' to the Republic of Portugal," local institutions of government 
—namely, the Governor, assisted by Under-Secretaries (Secretarios-Adjuntos) 
and advised by a Consultative Council, the Legislative Assembly, the 
~
L
 Macau covers just 17.41 square kilometres (said to increase hy 20 per cent upon the completion ol 
a landfill project [Nam Van Lakes]: see Victoria Finlay, 'The Digest Gamble,' South China Morning 
Post, 29 January 1994); according to an official census conducted in August 1991, Macau h;o a 
population of 355,693 residents (see Hamid Brunning, 'Macau Census Yields Few Surprises,' I long 
Kong Standard, 15 March 1993). Others estimate the current population to he 464,000: see Jonathan 
Porter, The Transformation of Macau' (1993) 66 Pacific Affairs 7, lOn. 
See Joint Declaration of the Government ot the People's Republic ot China and the Government ol 
the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau, signed on 15 April 1987 in Beijing (hereafter 
'Sino-Portuguese Declaration') Art 1, Official Journal of the Government Council of the PRC 1987, 
No 16, p 549, reprinted in (1987) 30(14) Beijing Review. 
"" Macau's 'constitution' — the Organic Statute (Estatuto Organico de Macao) ot 1 February 1976 — 
derives its 'normative power' from the Portuguese constitution. As pointed out, however, by R Atonso 
and F G Pereira, the distinctive nature of the two orders is reflected, for example, in the placing ol 
initiative for constitutional revision or amendments of the Organic Statute within the authority of 
the Governor of Macau or the Legislative Assembly; similarly, the appointment ot the Governor, 
while ultimately made by the President of Portugal, is subject to previous'consultations with the local 
population, through the Legislative Assembly and bodies representing the social interests ot the 
territory.' See 'The Constitution and Legal System' in R D Crcmer (ed), Macau: Cit/v of Commerce 
and Culture (Macau: API Press, 2nd ed 1991), pp 284-5. 
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judiciary,23 as well as bodies such as the municipal councils,24 and public 
institutes25 — are endowed with a considerable degree of 'self-governing' 
capacity in respect of what is recognised as fundamental government functions 
(that is, promulgation of laws, maintenance of order, collection of taxes, 
dispensation of justice, and conduct of social affairs).26 
The maintenance of the territory's political and administrative autonomy 
is guaranteed under the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, which provides 
that the Macau Special Administrative Region will 'enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy' and 'be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial 
power, including that of final adjudication.'27 Similar provisions are incorpo-
rated in the Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region, promul-
gated on 31 March 1993.28 
International relationships and associations 
Although only the 'limited sovereign' of Macau,29 the Republic of Portugal, 
through its President, is the territory's representative in the realm of public 
international law. Under the Organic Statute of Macau,30 '[t]he powers to deal 
with matters relating to foreign relations, international agreements or conven-
tions, and the powers to represent Macau shall be vested in the President' who 
is nonetheless authorised to delegate to the Governor the 'powers to handle 
matters concerning the territory' and its external security.31 Such competence 
has been employed by the Governor 'in the field of neighbourly relations.'32 It 
has been used, for example, to facilitate the conclusion by Macau, on its own, 
of several bilateral agreements on textiles (with the EEC, USA, Canada, 
Note that following the 1989 revision of the Portuguese Constitution — which provided for an 
autonomous judiciary for Macau, adapted to local characteristics and specific requirements — and 
the enactment of the 1990 Law of Judicial Organisation, previous 'links' with the Portuguese judicial 
system have been largely severed. For a discussion of the 'evolution of an autonomous judiciary' in 
Macau, see Jorge Costa Oliviera et al, 'An Outline of the Macau Legal System' (1993) 23 HKLJ 358, 
378-82. 
The Councils — the Leal Senado and Camera Municipal das Ilhas — provide cultural, recreational, 
and environmental sanitation services to Peninsular Macau and the Taipa and Coloane islands 
respectively. 
' For example, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority, the 
Cultural Institute of Macau, the Institute for the Promotion of Investment in Macau, and the 
Institute for Housing. 
It may he noted that the Organic Statute was revised in 1990 to give the territory even 'broader 
legislative, financial and judicial autonomy,' inter alia by strengthening the Legislative Assembly and 
its representation (adding six Assembly seats). See Afonso and Pereira (note 22 above), p 284. 
" Art 2(2). 
See Chapter II ('Relationship Between the Central Authorities and the Macau Special Administra-
tive Region'), Arts 12-23, Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau (hereafter the 
Basic Law), text reprinted in 36 Beijing Review, 3 May 1993. 
See F G Pereira, 'Towards 1999: The Political Status of Macau in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries' in Cremer (note 22 above), pp 261, 269ff. 
L
 For an English version, see Peter Wesley-Smith, 'Macau' in Blaustein and Blaustein (eds), Constitu-
tions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties (New York: Oceana, 1987). 
3J Arts 3, 12. 
32
 Walter Rudolf, 'Macau' in R Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1981-date), 
Instl 12 (1990), p 224-
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Sweden, Austria, Norway) as well as its subscription to the instrument which 
created the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau.5' 
While Macau's participation in international organisations largely reflects 
the previously narrow base of its economy, and its somewhat peripheral 
existence, recent trends point to an increased international orientation and a 
desire to assume a more active role in the global arena.'4 The recently acquired 
status as a 'full member' in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) is a strong manifestation of this change in circumstances and attitude. 
Also of significance is Macau's memberships in the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP),35 the Asian and Pacific 
Development Centre (APDC),56 the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO),57 the World Tourist Association (WTO), and the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). 
It is anticipated that to accomplish the aims of developing Macau as an 
'international city,' the Portuguese and Chinese authorities would co-operate 
to secure Macau's participation in other important international organisa-
tions.38 In fact, under the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, the Macau 
Special Administrative Region 'may on its own, using the name "Macau, 
China," maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agree-
ments with states, regions and relevant international or regional organisations 
in the appropriate fields, such as the economy, trade, finance, shipping, 
communications, tourism, culture, science and technology and sports.'59 In 
such a capacity, the Macau SAR may also 'participate in international 
organisations and conferences not limited to states,'40 whereas in international 
organisations or conferences which are limited to states, representatives of the 
Macau SAR 'may participate as members of the delegations of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China ... or may attend in such other capacity as 
may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the organisation or 
conference concerned, and may express their views in the name of "Macau, 
33
 SeeRui Afonsoand FranciscoGoncalves Pereira, 'The Political Status and Government Institutions 
of Macau* (1986)16HKL]28,40n. 
For a list of the 'international Organizations Joined by Macau' see Liu Rolong, 'International 
Organization and Macau's Development'(1993) 10 Journal of Macau Studies 17, 19. 
3
' ESCAP is a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations charged with 
the co-ordination of economic and social planning within the region; its activities range from 
providing research and planning for economic development to carrying out development projects. 
The APDC is an inter-governmental institution for policy research and training related to develop-
ment. Participation enables members to be involved in the research programmes of APDC; to take 
part in regional discussions on developmental issues; to have a wider contact with academic and 
policy makers in other countries; and to facilitate the process of closer economic co-operation in the 
region. 
The IMO, a United Nations specialised agency, is the principal world organ for co-ordination of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters affecting shipping engaged in 
international trade. 
See Liu (note 34 above). 
39
 Annex I, Sec VIII. 
40
 Ibid. 
334 Analysis (1994) HKLJ 
China.'"41 The territory's lattitude to engage in international relations is 
reaffirmed and restated in some detail in the Basic Law of the Macau SAR.42 
International legitimacy 
There is no universally accepted test of'legitimacy' by which the eligibility of 
candidates for 'international personality' is measured, although some support 
may be adduced for denying recognition of 'statehood' to entities which have 
been created in violation of fundamental principles of international law such 
as non-racial discrimination and self-determination.43 
At the same time, it is evident that the international community expects its 
members to structure their political arrangements on principles inherent in the 
idea of representativeness and responsible government. The emergence of such 
a norm of 'democratic governance'44 is amply depicted in international decla-
rations, stressing that the 'will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of 
all governments. '4i 
If the 'legitimacy' factor is accepted as relevant to international personality, 
it may be inquired to what extent could the Macau government be said to be 
representative of its people and conducting the political, economic, social, and 
cultural affairs of the territory with reference to wishes and interests of the local 
population. 
As noted earlier, Macau is ruled by a Governor (assisted by Under-
Secretaries) who is appointed by the President of Portugal, after consultation 
with the Macau Legislative Assembly and representatives of the territory's 
social interests. The Legislative Assembly is composed of twenty-three depu-
ties with four-year tenures of office, of whom only eight are elected by direct 
universal suffrage; eight deputies are elected by indirect suffrage (from among 
local residents with recognised merit and standing in the local community);46 
and seven are appointed by the Governor. The Governor's advisory body, the 
Consultative Council, consists of five members appointed by the Governor and 




 See Ch VII, Arts 135-42. 
Examples often cited by textbooks are Southern Rhodesia and the territories of Venda, Ciskei, 
Transkei, and Bophuthatswana. See, eg, Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (2nded, 1993), 
44 P H 
See Thomas M Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 American 
Journal of International Law 46 (it is Franck's conclusion, following a rigorous analysis, that what he 
tetms 'the democratic entitlement' has evolved as a normative rule of the international system). 
Sec 6, Copenhagen Declaration of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE], 
reprinted in (1990) 29 International Legal Materials 1305; sec also Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
under which members of the CSCE, ushering in a 'new era of democracy, peace and unity,' pledged 
'to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of [their] nations.' 
Reprinted in (1991) 30 International Legal Materials 190. 
That is, nominated by local civic associations following election by functional constitutencies 
representing economic, labour, professional and cultural, educational, and social interests. 
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Although generally 'moves towards democratic reform have not been 
encouraged,'4' some democratic element was introduced by the new electoral 
law of 1988 into Macau's two municipal councils. Thus, an expanded Leal 
Senado is now composed of fifteen members: six directly elected, six indirectly 
elected, and three appointed. The Camera Municipal das Ilhas, which in the 
past had no elected members, now has four directly elected, four indirectly 
elected, and three appointed councillors. 
The Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, which purports to give expression 
to the principle of 'Macau residents administering Macau' (Aoren ihi Ao), 
stipulates that '[b]oth the government and the legislature of Macau Special 
Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The Chief 
Executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis 
of the results of elections or consultations to be held in Macau';4> 'The 
executive authorities shall be accountable to the legislature,'41' the majority oi 
which 'shall be elected.'10 Similar provisions and further elaboration are also 
contained in the SAR's Basic Law.1' 
Needless to say, Macau people have thus far exercised little control over 
their destiny. They were not consulted prior to the signing of the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration12 nor have they had a major impact on the 
drafting of the Basic Law.1' Criticism has also been levelled at the slow process 
of 'decolonisation/localisation' of the Macau administration.14 Yet, within 
the existing democratic deficiency in respect of the ability of the people ot 
Macau to change their government or determine their political future, it has 
been observed that Macau's citizens 'enjoy a wide range of rights and freedoms."1 
4
' See Richard Louis Edmonds, 'Macau: Past, Present and Future' ( 1 W ) 24 Asian Attain 3, 8. 
4S
 Art 2 (3). 
49
 Annex I, Sec II. 
!° Annex I, Sec III. 
11
 See Chapter IV ('Political Structure'), Arts 4^—102. Under the Decision ot the National People'* 
Congress on the Method for the Formation ot the First Government, the First Legislative Council, 
the First Judiciary of the Macau Special Administrative Region, adopted hy the Fight Nation.i! 
People's Congress at its First Session on 31 March 1993, the first Legislative Council will retain it-
present composition ot 23 members, 'with 8 members returned through direct elections, 8 members 
returned through indirect elections, and 7 members appointed by the Chief Executive.' 
'- See Jamie Walker, 'Macau in the Dark in Terms ot Agreement,' South China Morning Post, 
24 March 1987; see also Louise do Rosario,'Time to Take Possession,'Fat Eastern Economic Review, 
9 April 1987, pi 4. 
I
 Drafters of Macati's Basic Law consisted largely (two-thirds) ot Mainland Chinese or officials ot 
Macau's NCNA (New China News Agency/Xinhua, die local political 'arm' ot the PRC's (,'entral 
Government) while the majority ot the 'Macau drafters' were 'pro-China businessmen.' See I lerbert 
S Yee and Lo Shiu-hing, 'Macau in Transition: The Politics of Decolonization' in Donald 11 
McMillen and Michael E DeGolyer (eds), One Culture, Many Systems. Politics m ihc Rcimificaiiim o| 
China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1993), p 191. 
See Goncalo Cesar de Sa, 'Lisbon's Obligation to Macau's Future,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 
8 May 1986, pp 40-1; Yee and Lo (note 53 above). The authors also note the domination of the 
Legislative Assembly by 'pro-government, pro-Portugal and pro-China' legislators and the insignifi-
cant number of'liberal-minded' legislators, which account tor the nature ot the Legislative Assembly 
as 'more an executive arm of the administration than an institution checking the executive power': 
ibid, p 189. The authors further highlight the success of Hong Kong's directly-elected liberal 
legislators in 'making bureaucrats more accountable to the public' and contrast it with the failure ot 
their Macau counterparts to 'increase governmental responsiveness': ibid, p 190. 
II
 US Department of State, Report on Human Ri»ht,s in Mciam in 1993 (accessed through Interneth 
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Human rights provisions of the Portuguese Constitution and (more re-
cently)56 the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights are applicable in Macau. Under the 
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, '[a]ll rights and freedoms of the inhabitants 
and other persons in Macau, including those of the person, of speech, of the 
press, of assembly, of association, of travel and movement, of strike, of choice 
of occupation, of academic research, of religion and belief, of communication 
and the ownership of property will be ensured by law in the Macau Special 
Administrative Region.'57 Post-1999 guarantees of human rights are also 
contained in the Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region.58 
The government of Macau is reported to respect civil liberties, including 
freedom of expression, although it has been noted that most of Macau's 
newspapers 'do not give equal coverage to liberal and prodemocratic forces' and 
that 'self censorship is growing among newspaper reporters' (and some academ-
ics are 'avoiding research on topics that entail criticism of China').59 
International recognition 
Whether recognition by other states has a 'constitutive'60 or 'declaratory'61 
effect has long occupied and divided international lawyers, who on the whole 
have tended to support the latter doctrine.62 That it is undesirable to accord a 
political act such as recognition a decisive force in the determination of 
international personality is subject to little doubt, even apart from the 'insolu-
ble theoretical and practical problems' which are raised.63 
Some contemporary jurists have indeed argued that, at least in respect of 
recognition of statehood, states no longer retain the authority unilaterally to 
acknowledge or deny legal status (as distinct from a discretion whether to 
establish formal diplomatic relations or not). Rather, it is contended, 
56
 See Macau's Official Gazette, Resolution No 41/92 of 31 December 1992. 
" Art 2(4). 
Chapter III ('Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents'), Arts 24-44. It may be noted that under 
Art 40, '[t]he provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and international labour conventions as applied 
to Macau shall remain in force and shall he implemented through the laws of Macau Special 
Administrative Region.' 
See note 54 above. 
L
 A 'constitutive' effect means that the act of recognition establishes ('constitutes') the international 
legal personality of the entity in question. 
A 'declaratory' effect means that recognition is only a formal acknowledgement of an ahead existing 
state of circumstances, indicating willingness to treat the entity as an international person. 
The debate has also found its way into judicial deliberations as in the case of S v Banda (Bophuthatswana, 
SCt, Gen Div 1989), extracted in 82 International Law Reports 388. After a thorough examination 
of the authorities and a careful evaluation of the relative merits of the constitutive and declaratory 
theories, Judge Friedman concluded (listing fourteen reasons) that the declaratory view is the more 
valid and acceptable one. 
See Dixon (note 43 above), pp 103-4. The author notes problems such as the consistency with the 
operation of any system of law that legal personality should depend on the subjective assessment of 
third parties, the degree of recognition required and whether some states or groups of states are more 
'important' when it comes to recognition. 
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international legal status is a matter to be determined collectively by the UN64 
(an argument which seems to be based on the somewhat questionable assump-
tion that UN political organs function as independent actors). Several recent 
examples, in fact, attest to the importance of collective recognition to ques-
tions of statehood, even over factual prerequisites (such as an effective 
government) or the legality of creation.6' 
It is clear in any event that pragmatic considerations often dominate 
principles or legal doctrines, and that different patterns of interaction are 
developed among the various actors in the international arena and new norms 
of behaviour are formed to cope with the emerging vicissitudes of international 
life. 'Recognition' may thus be inferred from treaty relationships, ministerial 
visits, formal communications, technical, cultural, or other exchanges. Simi-
larly, memberships in international organisations may be taken to imply (at the 
very least) an acknowledgement of the entity's ability to carry out the essential 
obligations of membership. 
As illustrated in Macau's various affiliations with international organisa-
tions, memberships in multilateral agreements, and bilateral accords66 with 
foreign countries, the territory has been accorded a measure of international 
recognition as an entity capable of engaging in international relations. 
International legal entitlements 
The relevance to international legal personality of the right to self-determina-
tion needs little restatement. As 'solemnly proclaimed' in the 1970 Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations,67 the territory of a colony or of other non-governing territory has a 
status 'separate and distinct' from the state administering it; such a status exists 
until the people of the colony or the non-self-governing territory have 
exercised their right of self-determination. The international personality of 
'self-determination units' has been affirmed by international tribunals as well, 
most notably in the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinions 
concerning South West Africa.68 
See Dugard (note 4 above). 
Dixon cites the admission of some former Yugoslav republics to the UN and the apparent acceptance 
of the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the International Court of Jusice in the Prevention of 
Genocide Case (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 888. The author also notes that 'Russia has 
been accepted as capable of succeeding to the Soviet Union's place on the Security Council and this 
was done purely informally through acquiescence of the old Soviet Republics and acceptance by other 
members of the Council and UN': Dixon, ibid, p 95. 
66
 Mention can also he made in this context of the 1993 Agreement on Trading and Co-operation in 
the Fields of Technology, Science, Economics, Finance and Profession Training signed between 
Macau and the European Community; the parties also agreed on the establishment of a 'Euro-
Infocentre' geared lo facilitating trade between Asian and European businesses. Sec 'Macau's New 
Lease of Life,' Window, 26 January 1994, p 35. 
67
 GA Res 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess Supp No 28, at 12, 124 UN Doc A/8028 (1970). 
See Western Sahara Case (1975) ICJ Rep 12; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1971) 
IC] Rep 16. 
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It is nonetheless evident that (at least insofar as the 'external'69 manifesta-
tion of the right of self-determination is concerned) qualified entities are 
assumed to have been subjected to colonial rule, alien domination, or racist 
regimes. They are also expected to constitute a 'people,' although no attempt 
has been made in any relevant international text clearly to define or character-
ise 'peoplehood.''0 
Could Macau be considered a 'self-determination unit'? Described as a 
'pragmatic anomaly in international relations,''1 Macau's status defies easy 
categorisation. In contrast to Hong Kong it has been 'administered by Portugal 
not on the basis of a fixed-term lease but by virtue of a series of shifting and often 
loosely-defined bilateral arrangments' with periodic assertions of sovereignty 
by each party.'2 Yet, whether 'pragmatic' or other type of imperialism, the 
cession of Macau to Portugal 'in perpetuity' was confirmed in the 1887 Sino-
Portugese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.'3 
While in 1972 the territory was removed, at China's request,74 from the 
colonial territories listed by the United Nations under the Declaration on 
Granting Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, no substantive 
decision had been rendered negating Macau's status as a colonial territory. Nor 
could the self-imposed restriction on Portugese sovereignty over Macau (as 
reflected in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976), the reluctance of Portugal 
to continue its imperialist role," or what is commonly referred to as the 
Portuguese policy of'benign neglect' in respect of Macau alter the fact that the 
people of Macau have not been able to change their government or determine 
their political future. 
Their 'colonial' status apart, whether the people of Macau are a 'people' for 
the purpose of entitlement to self-determination hinges on which view of 
national selfhood is adopted. It may be contended, for example, that the 
w
 'External self-determination' alludes to the achievement of independence or other appropriate legal 
status by peoples under colonial and alien domination; 'internal self-determination' refers to the right 
of citizens to maintain, assure, and perfect their full legal, political, economic, and cultural 
sovereignty; as well as the right of ethnic, racial, or religious segments of the population in a sovereign 
country not to be oppressed by a discriminatory government. See A Cassese, International Law in a 
Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
11
 The on-going debate among scholars is structured by two main concepts of 'peoplehood': one focusing 
on relatively subjective factors in determining the identity of the 'self (in self-determination), 
whereas the opposite stresses certain objective characterisations of a group of people, such as common 
territory, ethinicity, language, or culture. See, generally, James Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
•_\ See Norman MacQueen, 'Macau: End of a Special Case?' 41 (1985) The World Today 167. 
'" See ibid. 
' Further arrangements concerning administrative rights as well as questions of law and customs were 
agreed upon in the Nanking treaty of 1928. 
See letter of 10 March 1972 from the Chinese delegate, Huang Hua, to the UN Committee on 
Decolonisation, reprinted in Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (eds), People's China and International 
Law: A Documentary Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p 384. 
" It has been reported the Portugal made two (unsuccessful) attempts to 'return Macau to China' in 
1967 and 1974. See Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 'Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of 
Bejing's Negotiating Behaviour' (1988) 20 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 253, 
at 256-7 (and references therein). 
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inhabitants of Macau have not exhibited a 'common subjective attachment' or 
strong nationalist sentiments, nor engaged in any struggle for an altered 
political status,'6 and hence cannot be regarded as constituting a 'people.' On 
the other hand, criteria such as territorial and social bonding," or the settled 
and self-sustaining nature of a community with its own institutions and civil 
administration, are arguably satisfied. 
Inability to establish the juridical validity of a right to self-determination 
need not, however, preclude a legitimate claim to international 'personhood,' 
especially where, as in the case of Macau, no threats to the integrity, organic 
structure, or vital interests of any state are posed. Reliance on the right ot 
'peoples' should, moreover, be favourably regarded in the context of a world 
community that is increasingly embracing human rights, minority rights, and 
indigenous rights. 
Sui generis qualities 
As commonly acknowledged in treatises on international law, legal personality 
may be extended to entities professing unique qualities which are appropriately 
valued by the international community. Examples cited invariably include the 
Order of Malta (for its dedication to the assistance of the world's sick and poor), 
the Holy See (for leading the Catholic Church), and, occasionally, national 
liberation movements (for their purported aim to combat colonialism). 
While Macau's contribution to global religious, spiritual, or social well-
being has not been particularly significant, it could perhaps emphasise its 
uniqueness as a 'microcosm of geopolitical history and crossculture interac-
tion''8 and its distinct identity which has been tenaciously maintained through-
out four centuries of existence. 
Evidently, the Republic of Portugal and the People's Republic of China 
have recognised Macau's special qualities and — using the highest form of 
international legal expression (an internationally binding accord) — have 
signalled to the international community their desire to preserve and enhance 
the territory's distinct personality. The Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration 
11
 Note, however, the 'ineffectual atentado' mounted in Macau in July 1975. See MacQueen (note 71 
above), p 168. The lack of nationalist fervour in Macau may lie in the absence ol grievance- (eg. 
ethnic discrimination, economic underdevelopment, poverty) that led nationalist movement- in 
other Portuguese dependencies such as Angola or Mozambique. According to a recent study, Macau'-
populace 'arc not resentful of the colonial government'; indeed, are 'grateful to the government tor 
the economic prosperity as well as the freedom ot speech and freedom ot publication.' See Herbert 
S Yee, Liu Bo-long, and NgoTak-wing, 'Macau's Mass Political Culture' (1993) 1 5 The Asian Journal 
of Public Administration 177, 189. The authors suggest that there may be a tendency to use Mainland 
China as a reference point tor comparison and hence residents ot Macau 'teel that the Macau 
government, when compared to the low efficiency, wide-spread corruption and incompetence ol the 
Mainland Chinese authorities, is not bad at all' (at p 191). 
'' A majority of citizens in Macau have 'emotional attachment' to the territory. See ibid, p 189. See also 
Porter (note 20 above)l p 18 (referring to the identification ot the people with 'Macau as a place'). 
'" See Paul T K Lin, 'Preface' in Cremer (ed), Macau: Citv oj Commerce and Culture (Hong Kong: L HA 
Press, 1987). 
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clearly reflects the intentions of the signatories to give the Macau Special 
Administrative Region an international capacity on its own, separate and 
distinct from any state that otherwise may be entitled to exercise sovereign 
authority. The Declaration confers on the Macau SAR express functions and 
powers that imply possession of international personality, including the main-
tenance and development of relations with states, regions, and international 
organisations as well as the conclusion and implementation of international 
and regional agreements;79 the issuing of its own passports and travel docu-
ments;80 regulation of immigration to the territory;81 and the establishment of 
official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries.82 
Does Macau have a 'Hong Kong-style' international legal personality? 
Although this question appears to have a rhetorical quality, given the relative 
nature of the concept of international personality, each case needs to be 
assessed on its own merits and with reference to its peculiar circumstances and 
distinctive features. Thus, notwithstanding their obvious similarities, a syn-
chronised comparison between the Hong Kong and Macau situations has been 
resisted. Moreover, in spite of the almost identical language used in the 
respective pertinent texts, there are important differences — not only in the 
pre- or post-negotiation maneuvers and tactics83 but in the political realities 
these texts are assumed to reflect. 
As may be discerned from the above application of the various indicia of 
international legal personhood in the context of the Macau case, the territory 
appears to have a legitimate claim to some measure of international legal 
personality84 by virtue of meeting factual requirements such as permanent 
population, defined territory, and effective government; a capacity to enter 
into international relations and associations; a reasonably 'democratic' politi-
cal arrangement; some international recognition as an entity capable of 
international intercourse; 'self-determining' potential; and a 'uniqueness' of 
sorts. 
Nonetheless it should be reiterated that the possession of legal personality 
does not denote equality with other international legal 'subjects' in respect to 
the scope of international rights and duties. Macau's entitlements and respon-
Joint Declaration, Art 2(7); Annex I, Sec VIII. 
Joint Declaration, Art 2(7); Annex I, Sec IX. 
Joint Declaration, Annex I, Sec IX. 
Joint Declaration, Annex I, Sec X. 
See Chang (note 75 above). 
If forced to engage in quantitative comparison—which may not be particularly meaningful — it may 
be said that Hong Kong possible enjoys a 'larger' measure of international legal personality both in 
the light of functions and powers conferred under the constitutive documents and in realpolitik 
terms. 
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sibilities under international law are circumscribed by the relevant constitutive 
documents and the applicable international customary norms.85 
Rock Mushkat 
Arising out of ... the Employment: Employees' Compensation 
and United Ford Development Limited 
Introduction 
For an injured worker in Hong Kong to qualify for compensation under the 
Employees' Compensation Ordinance, it is not enough to prove that the 
accident causing the injury arose in the course of the employment.1 According 
to s 5(1) the worker must also show that the accident arose 'out of the 
employment.'2 The judicial interpretation to be put on this curiously worded 
phrase has considerable practical importance. Recently, for instance, a number 
of employees of the Shamshuipo branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 
were killed when an intruder, apparently motivated by a personal grudge 
against one of the staff, threw a firebomb into the bank's premises.5 Although 
that accident certainly arose in the course of the employment of the bank's staff, 
it is not entirely clear that the accident would (if litigated) also be held to have 
arisen out of the employment. This note will consider the 'arising out of the 
employment' requirement in the light of a recent decision of the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal, FungYin-yee v United Ford Development? a decision which, it 
will be shown, clarifies the meaning of that requirement and in the process 
advances the position of workers in Hong Kong seeking compensation under 
the Employees' Compensation Ordinance. 
For an analysis of the content and extent of Hong Kong's international personality, see R Mushkat, 
'Hong Kong as an International Legal Person' (1992) 6 Emory International Law Review 105, 123— 
70. 
Reader, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong. 
Although this is a condition for compensation: s 5(1). It involves essentially temporal and spatial 
considerations, conditioned by reference to the worker's service: Dover Navigation Co v Isabella Craig 
[1940] AC 190, 199. Put more simply, the worker must be shown to have been doing the employer's 
work when injured. 
More fully, s 5(1) requires 'personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employment ...' Therefore it is a further requirement that the worker was injured by 'accident,' as 
opposed to a continuing process, as explained recently in Wong Chick v Swire Pacific Limited (1992) 
HCt, ECCNol65of 1991 (noise over a course of years causing deafness not an accident). And finally, 
the worker must show that he was engaged in a contract of service (s 2(1)), as opposed to a contract 
of services, the current judicial interpretation of which is to be found in the Privy Council decision 
in Lee Ting-sang v Chung Chi-keung [1990] HKLR 764. 
3
 South China Morning Post, 11 January 1994. 
4
 (1993) Civ App No 149 of 1992. 
